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He exploits Aristotle's concession that the world contains only finite power. Simplicius' presentation of Philoponus' arguments which may well be tendentious , together with his replies, tell us a good deal about both Philosophers. From Aristotle to Augustine 14 editions published between and in English and Chinese and held by WorldCat member libraries worldwide. On sophistical refutations ; On coming-to-be and passing away ; On the cosmos by Aristotle Book 6 editions published between and in English and Greek, Ancient and held by WorldCat member libraries worldwide.

On sophistical refutations. On coming-to-be and passing-away. On the cosmos. Furley by Aristotle Book 12 editions published between and in 3 languages and held by 91 WorldCat member libraries worldwide Nearly all the works Aristotle BCE prepared for publication are lost; the priceless ones extant are lecture-materials, notes, and memoranda some are spurious. They can be categorized as practical; logical; physical; metaphysical; on art; other; fragments.

From Aristotle to Augustine Book 1 edition published in in English and held by 73 WorldCat member libraries worldwide. Routledge history of philosophy by David J Furley Book 13 editions published between and in English and held by 71 WorldCat member libraries worldwide The final volume to be published in the acclaimed Routledge History of Philosophy series provides an authoritative and comprehensive survey and analysis of the key areas of late Greek and early Christian Philosophy.

On sophistical refutations ; On coming-to-be and passing away by Aristotle Book 2 editions published between and in English and held by 61 WorldCat member libraries worldwide. Audience Level. Related Identities. Associated Subjects. David J. From Aristotle to Augustine. London: Routledge, , Fritz, Kurt von. Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung. Berli:, De Gruyter, Furley, David ed. London and New York: Routledge, The Histories. London: David Campbell Publishers, The Ideals of Greek culture.

I: Archaic Greece. The Mind of Athens. Oxford University Press, Pelling, Christopher. IV, Lipsiae, in aedibus B. Raaflaub, Kurt, A. Josiah Ober and Robert W. Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press, Reinhardt, Karl. Gesammelte Essays zur Philosophie und Geschichtsschreibung. Rowe, Christopher ed. Theoutermost sphere belonging to Jupiter, J 1 , moves with the motion of thefixed stars. So one of these isredundant. The same applies to all of the inner planetary bodies. It is notclear why Aris to tle did not economize in this way.

They can be listed as follows positive followed bycounteracting spheres :. It seems that the outermostsphere of Saturn is identical with the sphere of the fixed stars, which is notcounted separately. Since Aris to tle concludesthat circular motion is natural to the element of which the heavenly spheresare made, it might seem that there is no further cause to be specified: itmight be the case that it is just a fact of nature that this element moves incircles, unless something prevents it, and the position of the poles of eachsphere and their relation to each other determines what particular circularorbit is traced out by each particular bit of the aetherial element.

Since inOn the Heavens he attacks Pla to 's theory that the heavens are moved bytheir soul, and is silent in general about the existence of an externalmover, it is tempting to think that in the period when that work was put to gether Aris to tle held a mechanical theory of the motions of theheavens. This would fit wellenough with one interpretation of Aris to tle 's well known definition of 'nature', in Physics 2.

But it can hardly be so simple. Change in general, including locomotion,is analysed by Aris to tle as the actualization of a potency: he insists thatthere must be some kind of agent that is actual in the required sense, andsomething that is not yet but can become actual in this sense; and thatthese two must be distinct.

They may be parts or aspects of the samesubstance, but they must be distinct from each other. The nearest to anexample of a self-mover is an animal: what moves it is its soul, what ismoved is its body. But he contrasts this example explicitly with themotions of the elements: the elements cannot be self-movers even in thissense, because if they were, they could like animals s to p themselves aswell as put themselves in to motion.

Aris to tle never makes it entirely clear what causes the natural fall of earth or the natural rise of fire; but in the last chapters of Metaphysics 12 Lambda he introduces the external mover of the heavenly spheres. God is. All the objects in the familiar world perceived by us werecomposed of a to ms with some quantity of void interspersed between them. The perceptible qualities of things were explained as the outcome of thenumber and shapes of the component a to ms, the quantity of void betweenthem, and their motions in the void.

In his theory, the beings primarily responsible for thecharacteristics of the physical world are the immaterial Forms, accessible to the mind rather than directly to the senses. The properties of perceptible bodies are, however, related to the nature of the particleswhich they contain.

Pla to describes the mathematical structure of particles of the four traditional elements, earth, water, air, and fire. The quality of heat, for example, is related to the sharply angled pyramidal shape of particles of fire. They may be regarded as a conceptual analysis of the qualitiesassociated with them, rather than as results of a breakdown of a compoundin to material components. It was a response to the paradoxes of the Eleatic Zeno, and wentlike this, in brief De gen.

Suppose that there areno indivisible magnitudes: then every magnitude would be divisible adinfinitum. Suppose such a division ad infinitum were completed: then onemust be left either a with a collection of undivided magnitudes which. Hence, Democritusconcluded, there must be indivisible magnitudes. Hence there are no indivisible magnitudes, but in dividingone never arrives at an infinite collection of simultaneous parts.

It would be a comparatively easy business to describe his theory if he hadmade it clear what exactly composes his continuum. There is no doubt that he adopted the four elements first clearlyidentified by Empedocles, and taken over by Pla to : earth, water, air, andfire. Thus earth is cold anddry, water cold and wet, air warm and wet, fire warm and dry.

UnlikeEmpedocles, he held that that the elements change in to each other byexchanging qualities. But water is not simply coldness and wetness: cold and wet are qualitiesthat give form to a substratum: water is something that is cold and wet. His theory of elementary change does not require a stage atwhich there exists prime matter without any qualities: what changes in to air, to continue with the example of evaporation, is water, and it changesdirectly, with no intermediate stage.

But each of the four elements hasthree-dimensional extension and resistance, and these properties remain inplace in some sense, if not exactly when a given quantity of waterchanges in to air. If that is enough to constitute a theory of prime matter, thenit seems undeniable that Aris to tle held such a theory. But his account of change requires that there never exists an instance of prime matter withoutqualities.

The four elements are given the familiar names of earth, water, air, andfire, but that is misleadingly simple. Fire is to some extent sui generis, anddoes not fit well in to this scheme. If we take a part of a substance such as blood or bone or skin, each of them has the same name as the whole: a bit of bone is bone, and so on. The anhomoiomerous parts are made of the homoiomerous tissues: a hand is made of skin, bone, muscle, etc. This distinction serves only to distinguish level 3 from 4 , not 1 from 2.

Earth, water, air, and fire are homoiomerous. But though they are all out of these saidelements as matter, in respect of their real being they are[determined] by their definition. This is always clearer in higher-level things, and in general inthings that are for an end, like to ols. But thecomplex parts composed of these—for example head, hand, foot—no one would believe to be composed in this way. Aris to tle Meteorologica 4. Material elements are the ingredients, but they do not make the naturalcompound. Empedocles and Democritus were wrong. We shall examine this again in the next section: for the moment, twopoints must be made.

In the case of an artifact, weshall want to know what it is for, the final cause; in the case of a livingthing, we shall want to know what it does so as to survive and reproduce. So we know about this object for example a saw , not when we discoverwhat are the shapes, numbers, and dispositions of its component a to ms orother material ingredients although we shall want to know somethingabout its components , but rather when we see that it is to cut wood andunderstand how its components enable it to do that.

We know about thisobject for example a frog when we see where and how it gets a living andunderstand how its parts enable it to live and to reproduce. So much is an epistemological point: form, or definition which putsform in to words , takes priority over material ingredients for the purpose of knowledge. But this is true about knowledge just because the same priorityoperates in reality. Matter-in-motion, by itself, does not make a saw or acup or a box, still less a head or a hand or a foot.

The forms or kinds thatexist in nature are the primary data. As causes of the production of individual members of species they take priority over the earth, water, air,and fire that are used in the production. It is form that dominates. How itdominates and operates as a cause is what we must examine.

It is true that Pla to locates the operation of these two causes in the creation of the physical world by the CraftsmanGod, whereas Aris to tle uses them to explain the continuous cycles of coming- to -be and passing-away.


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But the function of the two causes is verymuch the same in both theories. For Aris to tle , the materials represent. Materials with certain definite qualities arenecessitated by the nature of the form they are to take on—a saw-blade mustnecessarily be of metal, not wood, and a bone must be made of somethingrigid, not liquid. They are also necessitating, in that they necessarily bringwith them the whole set of their own properties, whether or not these areall necessitated by the forms. What theycan bring about is described in the fourth book of Meteorologica, where hedistinguishes four layers of complexity of natural objects, as we have seen.

The point Aris to tle makes in the quotation at the beginning of this sectionis that the necessitating properties of matter become less and less dominantwith each step up through the layers. They have the greatest effect in theformation of the homoiomerous tissues from the elements. Thenature of the homoiomerous bodies is determined by these properties, to gether with the degree of heaviness or lightness imported by theproportions of each of the simple bodies in their composition. They are all to be thought of as real features of thenatural world, generated by the interactions of the simple bodies but notreducible to them.

But even at this level, the generation of the complex out of the relativelysimple is rarely caused solely by matter in motion. Homoiomerous tissueslike oakwood, fishskin or cowhide are plainly enough not brought in to being by the action of the sun and the natural properties of the four simplebodies, and nothing else.

Aris to tle says no more than that the causativeaction of form is less obvious at the lower stages, not that it is entirelyabsent. The four are listed in Physics 2. In another way, the form or the archetype, i. Again, the primary source of the change or rest…. Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing isdone…. These are traditionally referred to as the material, formal, efficient, andfinal causes. But the bronze of which it is made may well be cited as being responsible for some aspects of its nature; so also its form, and the end or purpose for which it was made.

In the last chapter of the Meteorologica, quoted at the beginning of thelast section, Aris to tle insists that it is inadequate to mention materialconstituents alone as responsible for the nature of the compound: inanything but the simplest objects in the world, form is of much greaterimportance. But form alone is still insufficient: it is necessary to specifywhatever it is that is responsible for giving this form to this matter—theefficient cause.

And in many cases, for a full explanation we need to knowthe goal or end served by the possessor of this form in this matter. It guideshis inquiries, and gives shape to his presentation of the results. The first of these provides two introductions to zoological studies. In the realm of biology, we have the advantage of being closer to the subject matter, and are therefore better able to study it. Moreover, thephilosophical mind will find great satisfaction in discovering and analysingthe causes at work in plants and animals, where Nature of fers much that isbeautiful to the discriminating eye.

Lacking a theory of the evolution of species, Aris to tle treats as the starting point for biologythe form of the grown specimen—the adult horse or man, the full-grownoak tree. This is in opposition to those who started from the materialelements—for example, Democritus. The first step is to understand themode of life of the animal, and to observe what it needs for survival andfor reproduction.

These are the two essentials for understanding structureand behaviour. The student of nature,therefore, will observe the animal and its parts, and decide first whatcontribution each part makes to survival and reproductive capacity. The student will understand the nature of the animalwhen these causes are unders to od. The semen of the parent carries the form of the parent and transmits it, asefficient cause in the process of generation, to the of fspring. The mechanism by which this transmission of form is achieved isdescribed in detail in Generation of Animals.

That theory, which is set out in the surviving Hippocratictreatise On Seed, and was probably also defended by Democritus, wasbased on the resemblances of children to their parents. Aris to tle argues thatthis proves to o much or to o little. Children resemble their parents incharacteristics such as their manner of movement which is not determinedby physical structure. Moreover children sometimes resemble grandparents. His own theory depends onhis metaphysical distinction between form and matter.

The matter of theembryo is provided by the mother, the form by the father. These movements are notsimply instructions, nor an abstract design or formula: they are derivedfrom the soul of the adult parent, and they are embodied in a materialsubstance carried in the semen, called pneuma. Pneuma, is a concept thatplays a large part in Greek physiology, from the earliest times, when it isequated more or less exactly with the breath of life. It carries also the idea of vital heat. But hedoes not give it the precise and detailed description that forms animportant part of S to ic theory, and he does not explain its relation to thefour material elements.

There is a single mysterious hint GA 2.

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Recentresearches, however, have shown that that the motivation of these treatisesis rather to examine the differentiae of animals for example the shape andsize of legs, the apparatus of the senses, the modes of protection and to relate them to the needs of the animal to get food, to ward of f preda to rs,and to bring up the next generation. But it isclear from examination of the texts that genos in Aris to tle can denoteclasses of varying degrees of generality, and eidos is not always subordinate to genos.

What Aris to tle seeks to do is to identify the kinds of animalsthere are, as defined by their mode of life in their environment, and to present comparative studies of the structure and organization of their partsas they are adapted to their function. Hence the supreme importance of thefinal cause. The biologist above all seeks to explain the connection betweeneach of the characteristic actions of each animal kind, and the structure of the parts of the body that enable the animal to perform these actions. Aris to tle constructs a scala naturae in which each higher step of the ladder isdistinguished by the addition of further faculties of the soul.

Plants andanimals have the basic faculties of nutrition and reproduction; in addition to these, animals have sensation, although not all of them have all of thefive senses; some animals, but not all of them, have also the capacity to move themselves; man has all of the animal faculties, with the addition of imagination phantasia and reason, which are also shared, in some smalldegree, by the higher animals.

There is thus an ascending order of plant and animal species to be foundin the world. We will discuss therelations between the species briefly in the next section.

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If a body is to have soul, itmust have the organs that give it the potentiality of carrying out some of thefunctions of life. The eyes of a corpse or a statue are not alive, but theeyes of a sleeper are alive although they are not seeing. The soul is a state of readiness, in bodily organs, to perform their function. It can thus bedescribed as a second potentiality, as well as a first actuality. The conception of an ascending order among living species, with thestages defined by the number and complexity of functions capable of beingperformed by the plant or animal, gives Aris to tle the conceptual apparatusfor working out a comprehensive classification of species.

There is indeedsome evidence that such a classification was a goal of his biological work,but it is not achieved in his surviving writings, where he is concerned aboveall, it appears, with understanding the differences between animals, andespecially with putting the differences in to relation with the organicparts.

He was handicapped by hisbelief, inherited from some earlier physiologists against the view of Pla to ,that the heart, rather than the brain, is the seat of the sensitive soul. Blood was thought to be, or to contain, food for the tissues of the body—the circulation of the blood was not, of course, discovered formany centuries after Aris to tle. He to ok respiration to be a way of moderating the natural heat of the body of animals with blood in theirsystem, although he had a use for the concept of pneuma.

The Generation of Animals contains a detailed study of the reproduction of many species. Aris to tle did not understand the contribution of thefemale of the species to the reproductive process: in his theory semen is thevehicle that conveys the formal structure of parent to of fspring, while thefemale contributes only the material constituents of the embryo, and insome species a protective site for its development.

But there areremarkable insights in his analysis of the function and structure of semen. Some creatures testacea originate from sea water; some plants for example mistle to e and animals grubs from putrefying matter. What is supplied from sourcesother than parents in these cases is pneuma, which is the material vehicle of life, and warmth.

So much is perhaps not hard to understand: there is moredifficulty in understanding how matter and warmth alone can supply theform, which in the case of sexual generation requires the subtle andcomplex contributions of the semen.

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From Aristotle to Augustine (Routledge History of Philosophy)

He does, however, in various ways and from time to time indicate clearlyenough that he regards the cosmos as being appropriately named: the wordcarries with it the idea of good order. We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the wholecontains the good or the highest good, whether as something separateand by itself, or as the order taxis of the parts.

Probably in bothways, as an army does. For the good is found both in the order and inthe leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on theorder but it depends on him. And all things are ordered to gethersomehow, but not all alike—fishes and fowls and plants—and they. For all are organised to gether with regard to a single thing.

Aris to tle Metaphysics The good thatthey achieve is the eternity of the cosmic order. That is to say, they ensuredirectly the eternal continuity of the motions of all the heavenly spheres,and hence the eternal interchange between contraries in the sublunaryworld, and the eternal continuance of all living species. Each natural thing has its own nature,and some of the effects of the nature of a thing are purposive only in a veryloose sense, if at all. The sentence seems to be a summing up of the manner of biological processes; it does not carry us far to wards an understanding of the order of the cosmos as a whole.

There is a striking statement in the Politics:The viviparous species have sustenance for their of fspring insidethemselves for a certain period, the substance called milk. So thatclearly we must suppose that nature also provides for them in asimilar way when grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man, the domesticspecies both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all eventsmost of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that they may furnish him both with clothingand with other appliances.

If therefore nature makes nothing withoutpurpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all the animals forthe sake of men. Aris to tle Politics 1. This is a claim that sounds more like S to icism than Aris to telianism. In thezoological treatises, animals are described in a more au to nomous fashion;it is not asserted that the function of any characteristic of oxen, forinstance, is to supply beef or leather. But thefunction of the parts of animals is not, apparently, to provide for man, but to provide for the continued life of their own species.

It manifests itself. In the case of the elements, it consists in their naturalmotions— to wards, away from, or around the centre. In the heavenlyspheres, it consists in their positions and in the regularity of their motions. In the case of the sun, it shows itself in the daily and annual cycles of lightand darkness, summer and winter, which have their effects on the mode of life and generation of biological species. Thespecies did not in any sense find their niche, or grow to fill a previousvacancy: it just is Aris to tle thought an observable fact that the physicalcosmos provides variously characterized environments, and the livingspecies have just those features that enable them to take advantage of them.

Aris to tle thus differs both from Democritus and from Pla to. The cosmos just is as it is. It is like a well disciplinedarmy, commanded by a good and effective General who keeps his troopsup to the mark in performing their various traditional tasks. This argument is found in the pseudo-Pla to nicEpinomis b ff. But Aris to tle is quite vague about the details of these motions, being content, apparently, to leave them to themathematicians.

But something hasgone wrong with the text or the calculation. If Aris to tle states the conditioncorrectly, the number should be Another interesting puzzle about the numbers may be mentioned at thisstage; it was first raised, so far as I know, by Norwood Russell Hanson [1.

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It turns on the question whether the axis on which each sphere turnsshould be regarded as an axle, with a certain thickness in diameter, or as ageometrical line. If it is an axle, and is fixed at its ends in the surface of its outerneighbour, then when its poles coincide with those of the outer neighbour itshould rotate along with that neighbour.

Thus we have a problem at thejunction between two planetary sets. The first sphere of Mars will rotate in 6 hours, the first of Venus in 3 hours,and so on. The solution to this is simply to treat the axis of each sphere as a geometricconstruction and its poles as dimensionless points.

This is consistent with thephysical nature of the spheres themselves, and abolishes the consequence of adouble rotation. The points of contact do not rotate, although of course theyare carried around with the surface in which they are located whenever theydo not coincide with the poles of the superior sphere.

The problems connected with theunmoved mover or movers of the spheres has of course been very muchdiscussed. Some notable examples: [1. Its authenticityhas been, and still is, doubted by some scholars. See, for example, [1. Bekker, 5vols Berlin, — Bonitz Berlin, Complete English translation1.

Greek texts with English commentary—some notableeditions1. Ross Oxford, Clarendon Press, Ross Oxford, Clarendon Press, Joachim Oxford, Clarendon Press, Hicks Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cooke; Prior Analytics, ed. Tredennick Tredennick; Topics, ed. Forster Forster; On the Cosmos, ed. Furley Wickstead and F. Cornford — Guthrie Lee Hett Peck Peck and ; books7—10, ed. Balme Peck, with Movement of Animals, ed. Tredennick, with Oeconomica and Magna Moralia, ed.

Armstrong Rackham Freese English translations of separate works, with commentary,in the Clarendon Aris to tle series Oxford University Press 1. Ackrill Smith Williams Hamlyn Kirwan ; booksZeta and Eta, by D. Bos to ck; books M and N, by J. Annas Saunders ; 3 and 4, by R. Robinson ; 5and 6, by D. Keyt ; 7 and 8, by R. Kraut BibliographiesRecent bibliographies in [1. General Introductions to Aris to tle 1.

Guthrie, A His to ry of Greek Philosophy , vol. Ross, Aris to tle London, Methuen, Proceedings of the Symposium Aris to telicum1.

20 Series Titles

During and G. Mansion Louvain, PublicationsUniversitaires, Owen Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, Moraux and D. Harlfinger Berlin, De Gruyter, Lloyd and G.


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  • Owen Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Aubenque Paris, Berti Padua, Antenore, Furley and A. Other collections of essays by various authors1. Especially no. Motion and theology1. Matter and elements1. This is a reflection of the idea that logic is a to ol orinstrument of , though not necessarily a proper part of , philosophy. In thetraditional ordering of these works the Categories comes first. It deals,among other things, with the simple terms subjects and predicates thatwhen combined go to gether to form simple statements, and it characterizesprimary substances as the ultimate subjects for predication.

    It also containsa treatment of ten categories, with particular emphasis on the fourcategories of substance, quantity, relation and quality. The DeInterpretatione, which is placed second, discusses the statements that resultfrom combining nouns and verbs, and includes a treatment of variousmodal relations between statements. ThePrior Analytics, which contains a formal theory of syllogistic reasoning,shows how statements combine to form arguments, and in the PosteriorAnalytics demonstrations are analyzed as explana to ry syllogisms from firstprinciples.

    This work combines the notion of syllogistic inference with anaccount of the nature of scientific first principles in its analysis of thestructure of science. The Topics is chiefly concerned with dialecticaldebate, and the work On Sophistical Refutations contains a treatment of various kinds of fallacies in dialectical argument. At the conclusion of thiswork Aris to tle indicates that unlike his other inquiries, such as histreatment of rhe to ric, that build upon the results of his predecessors, prior to his own efforts there simply was no general inquiry concerningsyllogistic reasoning.

    The Rhe to ric, not itself included in the Organon, is. Essentialpredications say what a subject is intrinsically, or per se. Given that man is predicable of Socrates, anything predicable of man, for instance, is thereby predicable of Socrates. The definition of the species man applies to him as well. These two types of on to logicalpredicability help account for linguistic predicability the application of alinguistic predicate to a subject. A simple subject-predicate sentence is used to make a simple affirmative statement in which one item is predicated of another, usually distinct, item.

    The notion of predication is employed in De Interpretatione 7 to distinguish particulars from universals. Although when used without combination, neither of these words has atruth-value, they may be combined to form a statement that is either trueor false. There are also particular substances, like Socrates, which are thesignification of names that function as grammatical subjects, but never asgrammatical predicates. The particular itself is always an on to logicalsubject, and never a predicable.

    According to Categories 4 the ten kinds of things that are signified bysimple expressions are: substances, quantities, qualities, relatives, places,times, positions, states, doings and undergoings. Although Aris to tle doesnot himself explain the rationale for this list, it is a classification of thekinds of things that could be said of something in response to a questionasked about it. The ten kinds of things signified by these kinds of expressions arestandardly referred to as the Aris to telian categories. Thesubject is called what it is synonymously from such predicates.

    In the firstchapter of the Categories, two things are homonyms just in case, althoughthere is a term that applies to both, the definitions associated with the twoapplications are distinct; two things are synonyms just in case the sameterm applies to both, and the associated definition is the same as well. Some universal X is said of some subject Y if, and only if, both the nameand the definition of X truly apply to Y.

    However,not only does the name of the species apply, its definition applies as well. Thedefinition of man is an account saying what man is, and the definition thatapplies to Socrates is the definition of the species man. The definition of thespecies man applies to particular men, and the species is predicatedessentially of those particulars. The defining expression that signifies theessence of a particular just is the definition of its species.

    In the Organon universals, not sensible particulars, are the objects of definition. The definition appropriate for a particular is the definition of the species to which it belongs. In order for a particular to be a logicalsubject, or subject of predication at all, it must be something essentially. The species to which a particular belongs, although not identical with theparticular, is what the particular essentially is. It is the definable somethingthe particular must be essentially if it is to be anything at all. Not only substantial universals, but any object of definition whatsoeveris a subject for essential predication.

    The color white, for instance, is a color,and hence color is predicable of white. Substances and non-substances alikemay possess definitions, and hence be endowed with essential natures. Inaddition to the names of substantial universals, there are also names of theuniversals that are accidentally predicable of substances. Despite this, the definition of any universal X that is accidentallypredicable of a subject Y can never be truly applied to Y.

    They are not called white in virtue of what theyare. In suchcases the subject is called what it is called paronymously from thatproperty. The brave thing is a paronym. In the Categories all beings except for primary substancesare predicable either essentially or accidentally of primary substances. Onthe other hand, a primary substance is a primary substance because it is asubject hupukeimenon for the other things, but is not itself predicable of anything further.

    In this treatise all primary substances are particulars—the particular man,the particular horse, and so on. Aris to tle here treats individual men,horses, and the like as primary substances. In the Metaphysics he alsoconsiders the claims of their matter and form to be substance, but in thiswork the individual is not subjected to the hylomorphic analysis foundboth in his natural science and the Metaphysics. There is no discussion inthe Organon of matter, nor of the relations between the individual man,his body and his form or soul.

    In the Categories primary substances are particulars, and their naturalkinds i. The only universals in the Categories are 1 secondarysubstances, 2 their differentiae, and 3 the various quantities, qualities,and other non-substantial items that are had by the substances. These terms classify particulars according to their natural kinds. In addition to its distinction between primary and secondary substance,with the attendant designation of the primary substances as the subjects foreverything else, the Categories also lists a number of the distinctivecharacteristics idia of substances, quantities, relatives and qualities.

    Forinstance, substances do not have contraries, nor do they admit of degrees. Most importantly, anything that can persist through time as numericallyone and the same while receiving contrary properties must be a primarysubstance. One and the same individual man can be pale at one time, darkat another; hot at one time, cold at another; bad at one time, good at. In this way the ultimate subjects of predication are treated as thepersisting subjects for accidental change. Theconclusion follows of necessity from the premises. In his account of thisrelation he appeals to characteristics of arguments that abstract from thecontent of the statements involved.

    He identifies a few obvious perfect cases of this relation, and then shows that all non-obvious imperfect casescan be reduced to the obvious.